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Cognitive theory of metaphor and idiom analysis 
We wish to establish to what extent the methods of analysis developed within the 
framework of the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor (CTM) can be applied to idiom 
analysis. Conventionalised figurative metaphors, and hence idioms, have a differ-
ent function and a different cognitive and communicative value, as compared to 
novel metaphors. Idioms contribute much less to the structuring of unstructured 
situations, but they rather convey different kinds of knowledge that they have ac-
cumulated in the course of their functioning in the language. What is needed in 
addition to CTM is a theory specially designed to describe the irregularities of 
idioms. To develop such a theory is the main aim of modern idiom research. This 
paper should be viewed as a contribution to developing such a theory. 
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1. Preliminary remarks
The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor (CTM, hereafter)—initiated by Reddy’s 
(1979) study on the “conduit metaphor”—had been developed mainly by La-
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koff, Johnson and their colleagues (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987, 
1990, 1993; Lakoff & Turner 1989). It met with wide response. The metalin-
guistic apparatus proposed in the framework of this theory (cf. the notions of 
conceptual metaphor, metaphoric model, source and target domain, mapping, 
conceptual correspondences, etc.) proved to be efficient for the analysis of all 
kinds of metaphoric expressions, from novel poetic metaphors to near-universal 
SPACE-TIME shifts in the semantics of prepositions. This metalinguistic apparatus 
has been successfully adopted and emulated by many other linguists, cf., for ex-
ample, studies on metaphoric expressions in different languages and studies on 
psycholinguistic aspects of metaphor processing. 
One of our aims is to discover to what extent the methods of analysis devel-
oped within this theory can be used in idiom analysis, and above all at what 
point they are not sufficient so that other instruments are required. According to 
the so-called “classical view”, idioms are frozen elements of a language and 
have arbitrary meanings. Within cognitive linguistics, however, most of the idi-
oms are considered motivated rather than arbitrary. Being motivated does not 
mean that idioms arise automatically by implementation of productive rules, but 
they tend to fit one or more patterns already present in the speakers’ conceptual 
system. The actual meanings of idioms can be accounted for by their imagery, 
so to speak, ex post factum. According to findings discussed by Keysar and Bly 
(1999), part of our understanding of an idiom is a backward-working rationale 
that attempts to make the idiom comprehensible. In this sense, idioms are parts 
of a conceptual system that is fixed in the metaphors of a given language. 
The CTM attempts to develop methods and tools for analysing metaphorical 
expressions of all kind, including idioms. Not all proponents of the CTM, how-
ever, have familiarised themselves with the generally accepted results of idiom 
research, as repeated quotations of the so-called “classical views” on idioms in 
their papers indicate. There is a consensus in phraseological studies – in the tra-
dition of Charles Bally (1919) – that idioms, for the most part, are not frozen 
elements and they usually are not arbitrary either, but clearly motivated by dif-
ferent structures of knowledge (cf. e.g. Fleischer 1997; Dobrovol’skij 1995, 
1997; Burger 2003). 
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2. Discussion: are all postulates of CTM consistent with linguistic 
data?
CTM met with some criticism. Critical remarks have stressed the overvaluation 
of the physiological basis in CTM, disregarding the cultural implications of 
many metaphors. This criticism concerns, among other things, the analysis of 
metaphors denoting emotions (primarily anger) in Western languages (2.1) as 
well as in languages that are very different from them, such as Japanese (2.2).
2.1. Conceptual metaphors, the humoral doctrine or something else?
One of the general – and seemingly very productive – conceptual metaphors, 
namely ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, has been found in many 
expressions in different languages (Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; Lakoff 1987; 
Kövecses 1990, 1995a, 1995b; cf. also Gibbs 1990; Gibbs et al. 1997). The as-
sumed “universality” of this metaphor has been a target of criticism from differ-
ent sides. According to Lakoff, Kövecses and Gibbs, this metaphor is based on 
physiological experience. The conceptualisation of ANGER as THE HEAT OF A 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER is supported by a physiological explanation in terms of 
body heat and increasing internal pressure, based on shared ideas about the hu-
man body. Due to the essential sameness of human beings and their physiologi-
cal functioning across cultures, this body-based conceptual metaphor has been 
regarded as ubiquitous in all cultures, if not “universal”. 
One point of criticism comes from Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995). Ac-
cording to these authors the body-based interpretation of the ANGER metaphor
does not apply to various metaphoric expressions that have been described in 
this way because the relevant cultural background has been ignored, cf. idiom 
(1).
(1) German jmdm. läuft die Galle über “someone’s gall/bile is overflowing” 
‘someone is getting very angry’ 
According to the physiologically motivated ANGER metaphor, “gall” is merely a 
“container”, randomly interchangeable with other hollow organs of the body, but 
this is not the case. As Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) point out, there is a 
motivating link between the literal reading and the actual meaning that is more 
convincing than the body-based conceptual metaphor ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A 
FLUID IN A CONTAINER. An ancient cultural model with a great deal of influence 
on European languages is the “humoral pathology” (primarily ascribed to Hip-
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pocrates and further developed by the physician Galen). According to this the-
ory, combinations of the four fluid humours of the body—blood, phlegm, black 
bile and yellow bile—determined the four prototypical temperaments, namely 
the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the melancholic and the choleric temperament. 
This doctrine was effective from antiquity and medieval times up to the 18th cen-
tury before it became outdated as a result of modern medical science (see e.g. 
Schöner 1964). 
In the medieval way of thinking, this fourfold schema was an elaborated 
semiotic system, which influenced several cultural domains. Within this semi-
otic system, the choleric temperament manifests itself in anger and irascibility. 
Anger was seen as an overproduction of yellow bile. Several idioms maintain 
traces of this in their lexical structure. Idiom (1) cannot be put down exclusively 
to bodily experience but has to be seen mainly as a cultural product. From clas-
sical Greek antiquity and medieval times up to the present, the humoral doctrine 
is still effective in contemporary metaphoric expressions. This cultural model 
continued to exist in popular belief for much longer, and the theory of the four 
humours has influenced the vocabulary of emotion in several European lan-
guages. The emotion ‘envy’, closely related to ‘anger’, is more clearly elabo-
rated by means of ancient colour concepts, cf. (2-4). The idioms in (2) literally 
mean “to be green of/with envy”, while the idioms in (3) prefer “yellow” and 
those in (4) “yellow” and “green”. 
(2) English: to be green with envy
French: être vert de jalousie
Spanish: estar verde de envidia 
Croatian: biti zelen od zavisti
Finnish: olla vihreänä kateudesta
(3) German: gelb vor Neid sein “to be yellow of envy” 
Dutch: geel zien van nijd “to be looking yellow of envy” 
Hungarian: elsárgul/sárga lesz az irigységtöl “to be/turn yellow with 
envy”
(4) Romanian: a fi mellen (e verd) da la scuidanza “to be yellow (and green) 
of envy” 
Danish: være gul og grøn af misundelse “to be yellow and green of 
envy”
J e z i k o s l o v l j e  
6 . 1  ( 2 0 0 5 ) :  7 - 3 5 ɱ 11
all meaning ‘to become or be very envious, very upset or annoyed be-
cause one wishes one had someone’s possessions, abilities, success, etc.’ 
The relation between YELLOW or GREEN and ‘envy, jealousy’ does not seem to 
be comprehensible anymore, but maybe there are associative links, just because 
these expressions exist. Connections between particular colours and tempera-
ments or emotional states are to be traced back to knowledge about the ancient 
humoral doctrine, which ascribed ‘red’ to the (lively, cheerful) sanguine person, 
‘white’ to the phlegmatic person, ‘black’ to the melancholic and ‘yellow/green’ 
to the choleric temperament, to anger, rage and jealousy. Although this doctrine 
has become outdated, some traces are still effective in contemporary idioms. 
There are many words like English bilious ‘morose’, choleric ‘splenetic, irasci-
ble’ or Dutch zwartgallig “black-bile like” – a loan translation of Old-Greek 
µİȜĮȖ-ȤȠȜȚțȩȢ (melancholikós) ‘melancholic’, Russian ɠɟɥɱɧɵɣ (želþnyj) “yel-
low-bile-like” ‘irascible’, etc. All these examples show that various types of 
knowledge have to be taken into account when explaining the motivational basis 
of idioms, including tacit knowledge of cultural models remote in time. There-
fore, there is reason for interpreting idioms such as (1) and (2-4) by means of 
traces of the humoral doctrine and not only by THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A 
CONTAINER metaphor. 
In further articles, Kövecses (1995b, 1995c) deals with Geeraerts’ and Gron-
delaers’ criticism, providing a corrective according to which both opinions are 
right: ANGER is a CONTAINER metaphor and, at the same time, based on the pre-
scientific humoral theory. These two influences seem to operate at two different 
levels of abstraction: at the generic level, which “gives us a sense of similarity in 
the conceptualisation of anger across [...] cultures”, and at a less generic level 
where “significant differences in conceptualisation, concerning especially the 
causal and the expressive aspects of the concept” are focused (Kövecses 1995b: 
143). However, speakers may have a vague idea of the (pseudo)-causal connec-
tion between “gall/bile” and “yellow/green” on the one hand and the concepts of 
‘anger’ or ‘envy’ on the other. This means that the conceptual metaphor deter-
mines that ANGER is in a container while culture determines which container (i.e. 
which of several hollow organs) is chosen. Some of these ideas have been modi-
fied by Kövecses (2005) where more attention is paid to the cultural foundation 
of metaphorical expressions. 
Even if this kind of connection contradicts modern scientific knowledge, it 
does not impede the processing of idioms like (1-4). There are many expressions 
in natural language that are conceptually based on ideas rejected in the course of 
development of scientific knowledge (cf. sunrise or sunset). Nowadays they may 
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be interpreted in terms of culture because all these old models of the world are 
part of our “cultural memory”. These “wrong”, “unscientific” ideas can provide 
motivating links for understanding such expressions. 
Another strand of pre-scientific folk theories with long cultural traditions is 
connected with the LIVER. It proves to be a culturally loaded part of the human 
body. In medicine of classical antiquity and Middle Ages, the liver was seen as 
the organ of vital energy and emotions, especially of wrath. Numerous idioms 
reveal specifics of this semiotised concept of the LIVER, e.g. the Italian (5a) or 
the Hungarian (5b): 
 (5a) Italian: mangiarsi il fegato “to eat the liver” 
  ‘to be very angry’  
 (5b) Hungarian nagy mája van “his liver is big” 
  ‘he is angry’ 
The concept of LIVER used for denoting emotional states in many idioms of 
European languages is an example of a metaphor interpretation that is typical of 
CTM. Like many others, it seems to lack a cultural component crucial for ex-
plaining motivating links. Kövecses (1995a: 125) analyses the Hungarian idiom 
(5b) only in terms of the CONTAINER metaphor. Aware of the fact that Kövecses, 
as a Hungarian native speaker, knows the meaning, functional properties and 
imagery basis of this idiom very well, we would still propose an alternative in-
terpretation, including elements of relevant cultural knowledge that may provide 
crucial motivating links. From the perspective of CTM, the LIVER is just a “con-
tainer” like any other. If this was true, any other hollow organ could replace 
LIVER in idiom (5b). This is obviously not the case. It seems worthwhile to em-
phasise the status of LIVER as a cultural concept, remote in time, though still ac-
tive in contemporary figurative language. 
According to pre-scientific anatomy, the liver was believed to produce the 
blood. The red liver, supplied with blood, was associated with ‘courage’, 
whereas the liver lacking blood was connected with ‘cowardice’. This folk be-
lief, once widespread in Europe, left traces in a few European languages. It is 
clearly tangible in English idioms from the field ‘cowardice’ (to be yellow-
livered/a white liver/a lily-liver) and in French idioms (avoir les foies rouges “to 
have the red livers” ‘to be courageous’, avoir les foies blancs “to have the white 
livers” ‘to have a terrible fear, be terribly worried’, donner/ficher les foies à
quelqu’un “to give/make the livers to someone” ‘to frighten someone, to make 
someone anxious; worried’); cf. also Italian avere del fegato “to have liver”, 
Spanish tener higados “to have livers” ‘to have courage’ or Greek µȠȣ țȩʌȚțĮȞ
ĲĮ ȒʌĮĲĮ (mu kópikan ta ípata) “the livers cut me” ‘I lose courage’, µȠȣ
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țȩȕȠȞĲĮȚ ĲĮ ȒʌĮĲĮ (mu kóvonde ta ípata) “the livers make me break down” ‘I 
am frightened, horrified’, etc.
 In all these idioms drawn from languages that belong to the Central and 
Southern European cultural area, LIVER is just not replaceable by, for example, 
“stomach” or any other hollow organ. There is a long cultural and historical tra-
dition as to why the LIVER represents a special place of emotions. Let us con-
sider the Ancient Greek myth of Prometheus being punished. In an act of venge-
ance, Zeus had him fettered to a pillar and sent an eagle to eat his immortal liver 
(i.e. the place of the juices of life and temperaments), which constantly replen-
ished itself. Therefore, the idiom (5b) must be primarily interpreted within the 
edifice of the pre-scientific folk models, and not merely as a CONTAINER meta-
phor.
 In other cultures, the KIDNEYs are believed to have similar functions of vitality 
(e.g. in the culture of Biblical times, above all in the Old Testament), or the 
HEART represents a salient concept as organ of feelings. Expressions such as 
English to lose heart, to be disheartened or Dutch geen hart in zijn lijf hebben 
“to have no heart in one’s body” ‘to have no courage’ reveal a related folk 
model, namely the semiotisation of the concept HEART, which is strongly effec-
tive in European phraseologies (cf. the French word courage itself, derived from 
cœur ‘heart’). The cultural specifics of these expressions become even more 
comprehensible when we turn to languages of distant cultural areas, such as East 
Asia (see 2.2. below). 
To summarise, we would like to stress that although CTM can explain signifi-
cant portions of figurative language (first of all, the mechanisms providing the 
understanding of novel metaphors), it is not a universal instrument in revealing 
all possible motivating links in this domain. In the field of conventional figura-
tive language (including idioms), many other kinds of knowledge, especially 
knowledge of cultural conventions with historical roots have to be taken into ac-
count.
2.2. Japanese culture, anger, and emotions as cultural constructs 
Japanese linguists have addressed some other aspects of criticism of the concep-
tual metaphor ANGER IS HEATED FLUID IN A CONTAINER. Partly they argue against 
the assumption of a universality of this metaphor (e.g. Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; 
Lakoff 1987; Kövecses 1990, 1995a). Here we pick out three points of criticism, 
concerning (i) the empirical data, (ii) the cultural uniqueness of the concept of 
HARA, and (iii) social factors. 
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(i) As comprehensive studies (Matsuki 1995 and Tsuji 1996) on ANGER in 
Japanese show, one point of criticism concerns the empirical data, which were 
not always correctly interpreted. Arguing that there are “many” idioms that de-
note ANGER and are based on the HEATED-FLUID metaphor in Japanese, Kövecses 
(1995a: 125ff.) presents sixteen Japanese expressions containing this metaphor. 
On closer examination, however, the bulk of these examples is made up of one 
and the same idiom. This is the familiar Japanese idiom (6). 
 (6) Japanese hara ga tatsu “(the) abdomen/belly rises up/stands”  
  ‘to be/get angry’ 
The form hara ga tatsu is the neutral standard notation normally used as a dic-
tionary entry, also called “infinitive form”. The same idiom is present in differ-
ent morphosyntactic and/or lexical variations, such as hara o tateru “somebody 
raises (the) abdomen/belly” (with a transitive verb) or haradatashii “abdo-
men/belly-rising”, but also in accidental example sentences such as anmari hara 
ga tatta node hon wo nagetsuketa “because (the) abdomen/belly rose up so 
much, I threw (the) book”, haradatatashisa ni mune wo shimetsukerareru “feel
straggled with (the) chest because of (the) rise of (the) abdomen/belly” or ha-
radachi magire ni “rising (the) abdomen/ belly in/with anger”. Furthermore, the 
Sino-Japanese reading rippuku “standing abdomen/belly” ‘anger’ is given as an 
example for the variety of metaphorical expressions based on the HEATED-FLUID
metaphor. To summarise, the Japanese empirical basis of the conceptual meta-
phor under discussion is certainly not as comprehensive as a cursory glance at 
the studies on ANGER-metaphors would suggest.
(ii) However, the main criticism of the interpretation of Japanese metaphori-
cal expressions in terms of CTM, which comes from Matsuki (1995) and Tsuji 
(1996), concerns the omission of cultural factors. At this point we would like to 
distinguish between factors that have to be interpreted within the framework of 
cultural semiotics and factors connected with contemporary Japanese society 
(for the latter see (iii)). It is questionable to consider HARA merely a kind of 
“container”. It has often been stressed that HARA enjoys the status of a key con-
cept in Japanese culture and has no equivalent concept in Western languages 
(e.g. Dürckheim 1956; Yamaoka 1976; Matsumoto 1988; McVeigh 1996, 
Hasada 2002). There are various Japanese figurative expressions in which hara
emerges not in its literal meaning (denoting a part of the human body, the lower 
abdomen) but as a semiotised concept. In all these idioms, HARA is a positively 
connoted symbolisation and not a “belly”. The concept HARA manifests itself in 
various semiotic systems other than language, e.g. in mythological and aesthetic 
symbolisations. Mention should be made of China’s ancient traditional medical 
theories with their way of thinking in analogies, or of the concept of a BIG/FAT
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BELLY, connected with Buddha or with Hotei, one of the Shintoistic Seven Gods 
of Luck, symbolising wellness and prosperity. HARA as the centre of vitality is 
also important in specific breathing techniques in Zen Buddhism, in sumo wres-
tling or in the ancient Japanese ceremonial rite of self-disembowelment, of cut-
ting out the vital centre of life (seppuku, mistakenly also called hara-kiri).
Within the framework of folk theory, HARA is considered the location of the 
spirit, of a person’s inner self, the centre of mental energy and emotions. There 
is no strict separation between intellectual thought and emotion in the East Asian 
way of thinking. Knowledge is not just a matter of mind and theoretical reason-
ing but rather an activity of the person as a whole; the instrument of thinking 
should not be the head but the HARA. What is “thought” in the HARA is taken as 
more fundamental than what is “thought” in the head (Dürckheim 1956: 55, 62; 
McVeigh 1996: 39). HARA contains some invisible, hidden truth. This culturally 
based concept emerges in idioms like hara wo waru “to split the belly” ‘to re-
veal one’s thoughts, to tell the truth’, hara wo kimeru “to decide the belly” ‘to 
make up one’s mind, to make a decision’, hara ga kuroi “belly (is) black” ‘evil, 
underhand, deceitful, scheming’, futoppara da “to have a thick belly” ‘to be 
magnanimous; generous’, hara ga miesuite iru “(one’s) belly is transparent” 
‘one’s true intentions are obvious’, hara wo mirareru “(one’s) belly being seen” 
‘to have one’s thoughts found out’, hara ga wakaranai “to not understand (the) 
belly” ‘I can’t understand his intentions’, etc. (cf. Piirainen 1995; Dobrovol’skij 
& Piirainen 2002: 72f.). Describing figurative language, from this point of view, 
does not mean finding a universal framework for all possible conceptualisations 
of similar entities across cultures but seeks to reveal the culture-specific features 
that make every language and the corresponding model of the world more or 
less unique. 
 (iii) Both Matsuki (1995) and Tsuji (1996) point to the fact that not all Japa-
nese expressions for IKARI (the Japanese pseudo-equivalent of ANGER) seem to 
be based on conceptual metaphors similar to those found in the European lan-
guages. Yet there is the factor of contemporary Japanese society, which makes it 
impossible in principle to compare Japanese metaphorical expressions denoting 
ANGER with corresponding expressions from American English. In Japanese cul-
ture, one does not express his or her anger but keeps it under control, especially 
in the public domain, where one is part of a social hierarchy. Many sociocultural 
factors (the maintenance of status-differences, the gender role, the differentia-
tion between ingroups and outgroups, etc., cf. Matsumoto 1996: 86f.) are crucial 
for the emotional behaviour of people and, therefore, for their conceptualisation 
of a given emotion as well as for the use of relevant metaphors. As a conse-
quence, the conceptual target domain of ANGER itself is not exactly the same in 
Japanese culture on the one hand and Western cultures on the other. Conse-
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quently, the metaphors (even if they look similar) can never be identical because 
they refer to different target domains. 
In sum, the stipulation of universal or near-universal metaphoric models is 
one of the most problematic postulates of CTM. Without being based on the 
analysis of a sufficiently wide range of empirical data from different languages, 
these metaphoric models are assumed to hold for all human beings just because 
they obviously correspond to biological features. However, languages often 
make use of a kind of cultural filter, which allows only a few biological features 
from a relevant set to pass through into the given conceptual domain. Similar 
ideas can be found in Wierzbicka (1999). She points out that almost everything 
in language reveals a certain degree of cultural specifics. In the same way, emo-
tion concepts (emotion prototypes) are not “universal” but differ from culture to 
culture, whereas the semantic primitives with which these differences are ex-
pressed in the semantic metalanguage, can be universal. What people say about 
their emotional states or what metaphors they use is not part of a universal, in-
nate way of conceptualising the world but part of a semiotic system that pre-
scribes what signs (both verbal and nonverbal) must be used in what situation. 
3. Idiom semantics from a cognitive viewpoint 
In this section we deal with the role of cognitive heuristics in idiom analysis. 
The first set of questions to be answered is: How far does conceptual metaphor 
explain the specifics of idiom semantics? What level of analysis has to be cho-
sen to achieve most efficient results? The second set of questions deals with the 
role of cultural knowledge for processing idioms. Can the relevant motivating 
links be explicated without addressing cultural phenomena? Or does their expli-
cation (at least in some cases) require addressing people’s cultural experiences? 
3.1. Idiom semantics and conceptual metaphor
It is evident that subsuming all possible metaphorical expressions of different 
languages under the same conceptual metaphor would be an important step of 
linguistic analysis. It would enable us to compare idioms with other kinds of 
metaphorical expressions and enlarge the explanatory basis. For example, ex-
pressions like to be down, to be low on the one hand and to be beaten to the 
ground on the other (all going back to the conceptual metaphor SAD/UNHAPPY IS 
DOWN) are analysed separately in the framework of traditional lexicology be-
cause of their different status in the taxonomy of lexical units. The cognitive ap-
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proach allows us to put taxonomic differences aside and semantically and prag-
matically analyse related lexical units across boundaries between taxonomic 
classes. Compare, for example, the following metaphorical expressions based on 
the conceptual metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION:
(7) English: to drive someone into a corner; to put a spoke in someone’s 
wheel; in a bind; in a fix; in a jam; up the creek (without a paddle); in 
queer street; with one’s back to the wall; there is no way out; between a 
rock and a hard place; caught in a cleft stick; encirclement; bottleneck; 
logjam; strait 
(8) German: in der Klemme sitzen “to sit in a clamp” ‘to be in difficulties, in 
a great predicament’; ein Klotz am Bein “a block at the leg” ‘a problem 
that is stopping someone from succeeding or progressing’; ausweglos
“without way out” ‘hopeless’; Engpass “narrow way” ‘difficulties with 
supplying, etc.’ 
(9) Finnish: olla ahtaalla “to be in [a/the] narrow” ‘to be embarrassed, to be 
in great difficulties’; olla pinteessä “to be in [a/the] clamp” ‘to be in a 
great predicament’; olla puun ja kuoren välissä “to be between [the] tree 
and [the] bark” ‘to be in a hopeless situation, in a great predicament’; 
heitellä jklle kapuloita rattaisiin “to throw cudgels in someone’s car-
riage/cart” ‘to hinder someone violently’; jku ei pääsee eteen eikä taakse 
“someone does not come out at the front nor at the back” ‘someone is in 
great difficulties’; ahdingossa “in the narrow” ‘in great difficulties’, etc.’ 
(10) Japanese: happǀ fusagari “eight (all) directions being blocked/closed” 
‘in a great predicament’; itabasami ni naru “(to become) squeezed be-
tween boards” ‘(to be) in a dilemma, in a very difficult situation’; atsui 
kabe ni butsukaru “to collide with a thick wall” ‘to be up against a prob-
lem’; nitchi mo satchi mo ikanai “not (able to) progress two nor three” 
‘to be in a great predicament’; fukuro no nezumi “mouse/rat in a 
sack/bag” ‘trapped/ surrounded, in a difficult position’; michi wo saegiru
“to block the road” ‘to hinder, obstruct’ 
Clusters like these provide a good basis for semantic analysis. From this point of 
view, the idea of conceptual metaphor as cognitive foundation for different lin-
guistic expressions is an efficient instrument of analysis, both within one lan-
guage and cross-linguistically. On the other hand, it is obvious that we need a 
more sensitive tool of analysis than conceptual metaphor for explaining fine-
grained semantic differences between the expressions listed under (7-10). 
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 Idioms and other metaphorical expressions based on the same conceptual 
metaphor often reveal semantic differences that cannot be explained on the basis 
of rather abstract metaphoric models. There are idioms that belong to the same 
conceptual metaphor and nevertheless display specific semantic features, cf. 
Gibbs (1990: 421):
Thus, even though spill the beans, let the cat out of the bag, blow the lid off, and blow 
the whistle each roughly mean ‘to reveal a secret’, there exists some convention such 
that spill the beans might be appropriate to use in situations where a person is revealing 
some personal information about someone else, while blow the lid off might be used to 
talk of revealing secrets about, say, governmental corruption.  
The two idioms spill the beans and blow the lid off activate the same two 
conceptual metaphors at the same time, namely MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS 
ARE PHYSICAL ENTITIES, so an explanation for the above-mentioned differences in 
meaning has to be looked for in another domain. It is obvious that these 
differences are caused by mental images corresponding to the idioms under 
consideration. Spill the beans evokes the image of an accidental, non-intentional 
action, whereas blow the lid off involves associations with an active role of an 
observer who makes certain efforts to look into a container where some secret 
processes are going on. Therefore, the explanatory power of metaphorical models 
increases if the corresponding source domains are oriented towards the basic level 
of categorisation (in the sense of Rosch 1975; 1978) rather than formulated in 
abstract terms like CONTAINER or PHYSICAL ENTITIES. This does not contradict 
Lakoff’s (1993: 212) postulate that mappings from a source domain to a target 
domain “are at the superordinate level rather than the basic level”. For the 
description of semantic properties of idioms inherited from the image structure, the 
level of primary conceptualisation, where rich mental images can be found, is 
more important than the superordinate level, which is suitable for relevant 
generalisation (for more details see Dobrovol’skij 1996). 
 Another example of the relevance of “rich images” for the semantic 
description of metaphorical expressions can be taken from the conceptual 
domain presented under (7-10). As the most salient feature of figurative 
language is its image component, the traces of the literal meaning inherited by 
the figurative meaning, and not only the conceptual mapping at the 
superordinate level of categorisation, have to be taken into account:
 (11) English (caught) between a rock and a hard place 
  ‘in a very difficult position; facing a hard decision’ (Spears 1997: 15)  
The explanation of the meaning given here is not sufficient because it neither 
involves the images connected with the individual constituents nor the metaphor 
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as a whole. The constituent rock, as well as hard place, evokes an image of 
something very solid, heavy, and immovable that hurts when one attempts to 
remove it, etc. The underlying literal reading (i.e. the source concept), on the 
other hand, is to be described as ‘lack of freedom of movement’. When mapped 
on the target concept ‘difficult position’, idiom (11) appears as a realisation of 
the well-known conceptual metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO 
MOTION. Still it is intuitively clear that this idiom cannot be substituted by any 
other English expression belonging to this metaphoric model, cf. (7). 
 The concrete image fixed in the lexical structure of (11) presupposes that the 
subject finds himself/herself in a situation where he/she has to choose between 
two possibilities which both entail difficulties and failure. Therefore, idiom (11) 
should be defined as (12). 
    (12) ‘facing a situation of choice between two possibilities that both entail 
difficulties and failure, as if the person pursuing his/her goals was not 
able to move away freely’. 
This definition seems to be more appropriate not only than the definition given 
in (11) but also than the following definitions (13-15), which are more elaborate 
than (11). 
(13) ‘in a difficult situation in which any choice that you make will have bad 
results’ (Longman ID 1998: 286) 
(14) ‘in a situation where one is faced with two equally difficult or unpleasant 
alternatives’ (Oxford ID 1999: 297) 
(15) ‘nothing to choose between two difficult situations’ (Penguin DEI 2001: 
17).
Although the definitions (13-15) point to the fact that an important part of the 
meaning of this idiom is the existence of a choice between different ways to 
manage a situation, they do not take the image component itself into account, 
which provides relevant links between the lexical form of the idiom and its ac-
tual meaning. This example shows the importance of developing an efficient 
metalanguage for describing the semantics of figurative lexical units in contrast 
to non-figurative ones, which would include discriminating semantically related 
figurative units that are based on the same conceptual metaphor, but reveal fine-
grained image-dependent specific features.  
 The presence of the idea of choice between two possibilities, both of which 
are perceived as disadvantageous for the subject, as well as the image-based ref-
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erence to a ‘lack of freedom of movement’ can be exemplified by the following 
contexts taken from the British National Corpus (16-18): 
(16) She wanted to scream the words back at him, but they log-jammed in her 
throat. To reveal the truth would be to render herself still more vulner-
able to him, and she couldn’t allow that to happen. But the alternative – 
to have him believing her poor showing had been caused by drugs, was 
equally untenable. She was caught between a rock and a hard place – 
with no obvious way out. 
(17) “[...] If you produce the right designs I’ll use them. And be only too 
happy to give you full credit.” He paused. “But, if you fail, I’ll show no 
mercy. You can absolutely bank on that.” That scarcely needed saying. 
Lisa felt a chill go through her. Suddenly she was caught between a rock 
and a hard place. “So, I would advise you”, he added, nodding at her 
folder, “to make a bonfire with those sketches and start again from 
scratch.”
(18) “[...] But if this is what love does to you, it’s perhaps just as well you’ve 
never suffered from the malady before.” Rory shook her head, sending 
her long wheat-coloured curls tumbling about her face. “Don’t be ridicu-
lous”, she said adamantly, then bit her lip. She was caught between a 
rock and a hard place here, she realised with grim humour. Since Adam 
had been monopolising practically all her time, she couldn’t protest her 
dislike of him too vehemently. Candy would pounce on that like a ter-
rier, demanding to know why she didn’t just tell him to get lost. But 
she’d given her promise, albeit with great reluctance, not to confide the 
truth to her friend. 
In all these examples, the idiom between a rock and a hard place means more 
than just ‘in a very difficult position’, revealing additional semantic components 
that can be traced back to the mental image captured in the lexical structure of 
the idiom. The necessity of taking mental images into account results from the fact 
that the figurative component not only has a connotative potential that modifies 
relevant imaginative associations of speakers but also affects the meaning and us-
age of idioms. 
 In general, the conceptual mapping from source domain onto target domain is 
only one of the tools of cognitive semantics. What conceptual metaphor can 
contribute to idiom analysis is, above all, provide a semantically structured 
empirical basis for investigating into both intra- and cross-linguistic specifics of 
figurative language. Especially promising is the possibility to compare idioms with 
other kinds of metaphorical expressions, on the one hand, and to structure 
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semantic fields according to metaphoric models, on the other. However, the 
semantic analysis proper requires a much more detailed description of mental 
images underlying the actual meaning of idioms. Among the main tasks of a 
cognitively based theory of idioms are, firstly, a description of all fine-grained 
differences between near-synonymous idioms both within one language and cross-
linguistically, and secondly, an explanation of these differences in terms of 
conceptual structures. The question is to what extent the specific features of 
meaning and usage can be traced back to the mental imagery. Are relevant 
constraints due to the usage only, or can they be explained in terms of knowledge 
structures fixed in the lexical form of idioms? A semantic theory that does not 
respond to these needs cannot be considered an adequate tool for describing 
idioms. Thus, the most efficient results of an analysis of idiom semantics can be 
expected at the level of rich mental images and rich knowledge structure (i.e. at 
the basic level of categorisation), and not at the superordinate level of 
conceptual mapping. 
 Metaphors as motivational basis of figurative units show different levels of 
abstraction. Let us consider idioms like to split hairs or to throw the baby out 
with the bath (water). The relevant motivating link is provided at the basic level 
of rich images, evoked by the lexical structure of the idioms. One could picture 
the situations to oneself, when someone behaves or acts as if he was splitting 
hairs, or as if he was throwing the baby out with the bath water, the images serv-
ing as bases of inference. An abstract metaphorical correspondence in the sense 
of conceptual metaphors at the superordinate level can hardly be formulated in 
these cases. In contrast, an idiom like to be slow on the uptake ‘to lack the abil-
ity of understanding quickly, especially of understanding something new’ pro-
vides motivating links at rather an abstract level and does not involve “rich im-
agery” of any kind. To process this idiom one has to access the conceptual 
metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING. In other cases, however, both the basic 
and the superordinate level of metaphor can contribute to the motivation of an 
idiom. 
3.2. Cultural components in idiom semantics
The concept of culture was addressed repeatedly in section 2. It has been 
pointed, from different perspectives, to the crucial role of culture in both under-
standing linguistic expressions and processing knowledge. The role of culture 
becomes even more obvious when comparing idioms from different languages. 
What seems to be “natural” in a given language and unquestionable from the 
perspective of one’s own culture turns out to be idiosyncratic and conventional 
from the perspective of another language and culture. In the realm of idioms, the 
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sameness of the human body provides motivating links between mental imagery 
and actual semantics less often than do the specifics of culture. In what follows 
we will discuss elements of cultural knowledge which are relevant for idiom 
analysis.
Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005) distinguish between five types of cultural 
aspects underlying figurative units.  
(i)  The first type is represented by figurative units whose underlying cul-
tural knowledge can mainly be traced back to knowledge of culture-
based social interaction within a given community, including all aspects 
of social experiences and behaviour.
(ii)  Figurative units of the second type reveal image components that can be 
ascribed to material culture, primarily to artefacts of a given culture, in-
cluding all aspects of material environment. 
(iii)  The third type of figurative units can be subsumed under the label “tex-
tual dependence.” Originally they are quotations or allusions. Thus, they 
are related to certain texts that can be identified as their sources. This 
type is similar to the next two types, although they should not be con-
fused.
(iv)  Type four is represented by figurative units tracing back to fictive con-
ceptual domains, such as ancient folk theories and pre-scientific concep-
tions of the world (including religion, superstition, ancient beliefs etc.). 
(v)  Type five deals with cultural symbols. In expressions of this type, the 
relevant cultural knowledge extends to mainly one single constituent and 
not to the figurative unit as a whole. The motivational link between the 
literal and figurative readings is established by semiotic knowledge 
about the symbol in question, about its meaning in culturally relevant 
sign systems other than language. In order to describe figurative units of 
this type we apply metalinguistic tools developed in the framework of 
cultural semiotics. 
Examples of type (iv) have been given in the sections 2.1. and 2.2. In the fol-
lowing we will concentrate on type (iii) “textual dependence” and (v) “cultural 
symbols”. Let us first consider the concept OWL as it is used in idiomatic expres-
sions across languages and cultures. We restrict ourselves to the languages Eng-
lish, German, Dutch, Swedish, French, Finnish, and a Low German dialect. 
There are only a few idioms containing the concept OWL whose motivation does 
not originate in cultural traditions or in symbolic interpretations (for this notion 
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see Dobrovol’skij & Piirainen 2002) of the OWL. Let us look, for example, at the 
French simile (19).
(19) French: avoir des yeux de hibou “to have eyes of a screech owl” 
‘to have big round and fixed eyes’
As owls really have big eyes (a salient property of the bird, which everybody 
can identify), this simile is based primarily on direct experience, i.e. immediate 
perception of the appearance of an owl. No other knowledge is required. 
Most idioms with OWL, however, are motivated by cultural phenomena in a 
wide sense. On the one hand, certain idioms are motivated on the basis of well-
known texts, i.e. the motivating link between the lexical structure of the idiom 
and its actual meaning is not provided by a conceptual metaphor but by knowl-
edge of the text in question and its role in the cultural tradition (type (iii)). On 
the other hand, idioms can be motivated via a key constituent, which is used in 
its culturally loaded symbolic meaning and does not directly refer to a certain 
entity in the world but to a relevant piece of cultural knowledge, i.e. to some 
semiotic phenomena (type (v)). An example for the textual dependence is pro-
vided by (20). 
 (20) German: Eulen nach Athen tragen “to carry owls to Athens” 
 ‘to present certain mental entities (ideas, artistic achievements, etc.) as 
being new when they are already well-known at a given place, or to 
bring certain objects to a place where there are already many of that 
kind’
There is an equivalent of this idiom in many different languages; in some of 
them it is obsolete (e.g. English to send owls to Athens, French apporter des 
chouettes à Athènes) or belongs to very elevated language (e.g. Finnish viedä
pöllöjä Ateenaan “to bring owls to Athens”); in others it is quite well-known 
and familiar, as in colloquial German, Dutch and Swedish (cf. Dutch uilen naar 
Athene dragen and Swedish bära ugglor til Aten “to carry owls to Athens”). Al-
though these idioms may be motivated only for well-educated people and seem 
opaque to the majority of speakers, the cultural knowledge, which is implicitly 
present in the plane of content of this idiom, cannot be neglected. The idioms 
originate from Aristophanes’ satirical comedy “Birds” (414 BC; Greek “Or-
nithes”), verse 301. The Old Greek expression ȖȜĮȨțĮȢ ǹșȒȞĮȗİ ȐȖİȚȞ (glaykas
Athénaze ágein) was used almost in the same meaning as idiom (20) and is still 
alive in the Modern Greek idiom țȠµȓȗȦ ȖȜĮȪțĮ İȢ ǹșȒȞĮȢ (komízo gláfka es 
Atínas) “to send owls to Athens”. This is the text that motivates idiom (20). 
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The motivating text is, in its turn, culturally motivated. Its basis is provided 
by knowledge about the function of the concept OWL in classical Athens. The 
owl was not only a bird that abounded in Athens but also the emblem of Athene,
the protective goddess of Athens. The coin of Athens bore an owl on the reverse. 
So there were plenty of owls in Athens (in form of all sorts of pictures), and it 
would have been superfluous and unnecessary to bring more of them. 
Now let us look at some examples in which the OWL appears in its symbolic 
function. As has been mentioned, the OWL in ancient Greece was dedicated to 
Pallas Athena, goddess of wisdom and the sciences. This cultural tradition gave 
birth to the conceptualisation of the OWL as a symbol of WISDOM and 
KNOWLEDGE, which is well established in the occidental world but would be 
completely misunderstood in other cultural areas, e.g. in East Asia (although 
many Japanese speakers have become familiar with this conceptualisation of the 
wise owl through Western literature). In Europe the OWL is often symbolically 
connected with intellectuality. The OWL as a symbol of ‘intelligence, wisdom’ it 
is known in philosophy just as well as a logo of an academic publishing house or 
a university, as a prize in an intellectual quiz show, etc. This has left some traces 
in figurative language, above all in similes, cf. (21). 
(21) English: as wise as an owl
Swedish: vis som en uggla “wise as an owl” 
both meaning ‘very wise’ 
This symbolic function, which is widespread in the occidental world as part of a 
shared cultural knowledge, does not play any role in idioms of some other lan-
guages. Surprisingly, another semiotisation of OWL, that of ‘stupidity’, has left 
more significant traces in idiomatic expressions across languages. The symbolic 
import of the OWL in culture is ambivalent, reaching from positive assessment as 
a symbol of wisdom to most negative estimations: the OWL is seen as a bird of 
darkness, messenger of bad luck and ill-omen (see Biedermann 1994: 249). 
Among the negative symbolic functions of OWL, the symbolic meaning of stu-
pidity appears to be dominant in some languages, such as Dutch, Finnish, and a 
Low German dialect called “Westmünsterländisch” (see Piirainen 2000, 2004a, 
2004b for details): 
 (22) Dutch: zo dom als een uil “as stupid as an owl”
   Finnish: tuhma kuin pöllö “stupid as an owl” 
   both meaning ‘very stupid’ 
 (23) Dutch: uil, die ik ben “the owl that I am” ‘the idiot that I am’ 
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  Finnish: mikä pöllö ollenkaan ollut “what an owl was I” 
  ‘what a fool have I been; what a nonsense have I created’ 
Interestingly, the two symbolic functions of the OWL, which are obviously con-
tradictory, coexist in the conceptual sphere. The widespread knowledge of the 
OWL as a symbol of wisdom does not impede the use of linguistic expressions in 
which the OWL emerges as a symbol of stupidity. Academic symbolism and 
symbolism of popular belief, being two different domains of cultural knowledge, 
neither influence nor affect one another. It is notable that Dutch and Finnish, 
two languages with a written tradition, do not employ the ancient interpretation 
but the opposite symbolic meaning. As for the Low German dialect Westmün-
sterländisch, this is less surprising, since the cultural tradition of the ancient 
world has had no direct influence on it. The dialect provides idioms with this 
symbolic function in its own way: ‘stupidity’ in (24a) is a property “inherited” 
by being brooded under an owl: 
(24a) Westmünsterländisch: he is under de Uule uutbrodd “he is brooded 
under the owl” 
 ‘he is very stupid’  
(24b) Westmünsterländisch: he is nich under de Uule uutbrodd “he is not 
brooded under the owl” 
‘he is smart, keen, cunning’ 
Another symbolic function of the OWL represented in some idioms renders the 
idea of danger, disaster or bad luck. The conception of owls as messengers of ill 
fortune can still be observed in popular beliefs today (cf. Opie & Tatem 1996: 
295f.). This symbolic function can be found in the Swedish idiom (25). 
 (25) Swedish: ana ugglor i mossen “to foresee owls in the bog” 
‘to feel something in advance, to sense danger; to begin to think that 
someone is trying to deceive you, or that something about a situation is 
wrong’
There is one Standard German proverb with OWL containing some Low Ger-
man elements (26). Low German Uhl ‘owl’ stands symbolically for something 
negative, in contrast to the positively connoted NIGHTINGALE. This symbolic 
contrast also can be described as ‘bad luck, misfortune’ versus ‘good luck, good 
fortune’.
(26) German: was dem einen sin Uhl, ist dem andern sin Nachtigall “what is 
the owl for the one person, is the nightingale for the other” 
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‘what the one person does not like at all, can be appreciated very much 
by the other; the disadvantage or misfortune of one person can be an ad-
vantage for another person’ 
 What is important for our argumentation is only the fact that in different lan-
guages we encounter idioms that cannot be explained via conceptual metaphors 
based on direct experience, and require rather addressing cultural codes, such as 
popular beliefs, literature, arts and so on. So, the linguistic analysis which com-
pletely relies on the conceptual metaphor is not able to explain how idioms de-
scribed in this section came into existence and how they are processed by the 
speakers. However, if an additional dimension of analysis is accepted, namely 
that of the semiotics of culture, many linguistic facts, which would be consid-
ered arbitrary in the framework of the “classical version” of the cognitive theory 
of metaphor, get plausible explanations. The question of whether these cultural 
codes themselves once, remote in time, came into existence by direct experience 
as well, does not belong to the scope of this study. 
3.3. Does the conventional figurative language need its own theory? 
The previous discussion has shown that it is not possible to exhaustively de-
scribe idioms and conventional figurative units of other types using just the ap-
paratus of CTM. The reason for this is that CTM was not developed with the in-
tent to analyse irregular features of idiom semantics and pragmatics. CTM is 
aimed at discovering general cognitive mechanisms governing cross-categorical 
conceptualisations. Such a gap calls not for the extension of CTM but rather a 
new theory. At present we are working on developing such a theory, namely the 
Conventional Figurative Language Theory (CFLT). Central to this theory is the 
idea that there is a specific conceptual structure underlying the meaning of a 
figurative unit. This conceptual structure, which we call “image component”, is 
based on mental imagery and is an element of the plane of content of a given 
figurative unit. Thus our basic assumption can be formulated as follows: The 
image component (a specific conceptual structure mediating between the lexical 
structure and the actual meaning of figurative units) is a relevant element of 
their plane of content. 
 Traditional structuralist approaches to figurative language made a strong dis-
tinction between “diachronic (etymological)” factors and “synchronic” ones. In 
general the differentiation between “etymological derivation” and “synchronic 
motivation” is not so important from the viewpoint of cognitive linguistics be-
cause both are based on comparable conceptual operations. Hence from our 
point of view research on the motivation of figurative units cannot refrain from 
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including etymological description as a constituent part. This does not mean that 
etymology always influences actual meaning and brings about relevant usage re-
strictions, but it cannot be excluded a priori. There are sufficient examples to 
show how the “etymological memory” of a lexical unit determines its behaviour 
in discourse. After clarifying the etymology of a given figurative unit, the sec-
ond task is to check for possible linguistic consequences, i.e. certain usage re-
strictions, traceable back to the etymology. 
Obviously, such linguistic consequences can be detected in the field of gen-
der-specific usage restrictions (cf. Piirainen 2001, 2004c). There are various 
cases of such usage restrictions in all languages considered in our study. Usage 
restrictions of this kind may be traced back to relevant etymological phenomena 
if the following conditions are fulfilled: 
x The inner form of the figurative unit in question points to a concept that once 
was prototypically and exclusively related with either females or males re-
spectively (e.g., a garment, a gesture). 
x The significance of this concept in question has been lost in the present. 
Using large text corpora shows that at present these lexical units can also refer 
to female or male persons respectively (except from all kinds of ironic or jocular 
use). Thus the gender-restrictions originating from the inner form of the idioms 
are stable components of their semantic structure. Let us have a look at idiom 
(27).
(27) German: seinen Hut nehmen “to take one’s hat” 
‘to resign from one’s post, office, to step down (referring to men)’ 
The inner form of this idiom is based on a physiological action. In former times, 
middle class men used to wear a hat in public. They had to take the hat off enter-
ing a room. If a man was leaving he took his hat, and the expression denoting 
this action developed the meaning ‘to leave a group, to say goodbye’ (cf. 
Röhrich 1991: 776). Of course, women also wore hats in public, but were not 
obliged to take them off when entering a room. Therefore, a woman who was 
going to leave did not have to take her hat. The consequence is that this idiom 
was originally restricted in its use and referred exclusively to males. Though the 
custom of wearing a hat in public has changed and the action of “taking the hat” 
no longer is of any importance, the gender-specific restriction of this expression 
still has an impact on its usage. The restriction to males clearly emerges from 
frequency analysis. Among more than 500 text examples drawn from the Inter-
net only one example has been found with reference to a woman, to be precise, 
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to a female minister. The text examples reveal another peculiarity of this idiom: 
the person resigning has to be socially important and their resignation has to 
have some consequences for a given social group. Either they come from a 
higher occupational group, such as ministers, directors, managers, chairmen and 
the like, or they are, e.g., a popular sportsman leaving a club. This usage restric-
tion can be interpreted as correlating with the etymology. The etymologically 
relevant feature ‘belonging to the middle class’ (wearing a hat was left up to 
middle class men) corresponds with the social importance of the resigning per-
son. So the elements of etymological knowledge (labelled here “etymological 
memory”) may have synchronic relevance. 
However, there is a gradual scale, from a clear relevance of etymologically 
anchored traces for the actual meaning and/or usage to cases where etymology is 
not important any more. A good example is the German idiom (28). 
(28) German: unter die Haube kommen “to get under the bonnet” 
  ‘to get married (reference to women)’ 
First, let us look at the etymological description. The bonnet (Haube) was the 
headgear that belonged to the traditional costume of the married woman. A sig-
nificant gesture was involved when the bride, on her wedding day, had the bon-
net donned for the first time (Röhrich 1991: 674). Second, the sociocultural as-
pects connected with the concept BONNET (a sign of being married; a married 
woman had to wear this headgear) have completely lost their familiarity in the 
present. It could be assumed that the “etymological memory” of the idiom pre-
served traces of this historical origin in the form of usage restrictions, but an 
Internet enquiry shows the contrary. About one third of the examples refer to 
males (Kronprinz Frederik kommt unter die Haube “Crown prince Frederik 
comes under the bonnet”; Boris Becker schon wieder unter der Haube? “Boris 
Becker once more under the bonnet?”, and the like). Obviously there is a trend to 
weaken the gender-specific usage restrictions, but it would be wrong to say that 
they have disappeared completely. We cannot decide whether a real meaning 
shift has taken place here (i.e. the abandonment of one element of the semantic 
structure of the idiom). Corpora alone cannot answer the question whether a us-
age restriction is in the process of being abandoned. We need also the relevant 
knowledge of speakers to be able to answer this question. However, empirical 
research along these lines would go beyond the scope of our study. 
In short, we do not argue that all motivation is based on the knowledge of the 
true etymology, but we do argue against the postulate that only “folk etymol-
ogy” is relevant for the processing and the usage of conventional figurative lan-
guage whereas knowledge of the real etymology is never relevant for explaining 
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motivational phenomena. The result of these reflections is that the investigation 
of motivation must include an etymological description. Only at the next stage 
of analysis can we decide whether the data obtained via etymological analysis 
are consistent with the specifics of usage and whether they are suitable for ex-
plaining the structure of the image component. Even if the true etymology does 
not influence the usage, it is important for describing the cultural context in 
which a given figurative unit came about. This aspect of research on figurative 
language is, to be sure, not central to linguistically dominated approaches, but it 
is significant from the viewpoint of semiotics of culture. 
4. Conclusions 
CTM is important for investigations into the phenomenon of figurative language 
because it provides the researcher with a well-developed metalinguistic appara-
tus, including heuristically significant concepts such as source domain, target 
domain, metaphoric model, conceptual mapping, conceptual correspondence, 
metaphoric entailment, etc. In many cases, applying this apparatus allows us to 
explain many properties of figurative units that could not be captured in the 
framework of any traditional approach. The explanatory power of CTM is espe-
cially high in cases where we need an explanation as to how a particular novel 
metaphor works. Speakers creating a new metaphor in order to be able to talk 
about a difficult, barely structured situation propose, by using this metaphor, a 
way of structuring the given situation, i.e. an original view on it. The metaphor 
is therefore not just a means of naming but also a way of conceptualising the 
world. CTM is the only theory which calls attention to this fact and offers ap-
propriate tools of analysis. 
However, conventionalised figurative metaphors, including idioms, have a 
different function and a different cognitive and communicative value. What they 
have in common with individual novel metaphors is their origin, i.e. they often 
use the same mappings; but their value in understanding a situation is quite dif-
ferent. This fact has not received enough attention so far. Conventional figura-
tive metaphors, especially idioms, contribute much less to the structuring of un-
structured situations than do novel metaphors, but they rather convey different 
kinds of knowledge that they have accumulated in the course of their function-
ing in the language. This does not mean that the metalinguistic apparatus of 
CTM cannot be applied to the description of idioms. However, what is needed, 
in addition to that, is a theory specially designed to describe the irregularities in 
the realm of conventional figurative language, including, among other things, 
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idioms. To develop such a theory is the main aim of modern idiom research (cf. 
Dobrovol’skij & Piirainen 2005). 
As for the discussion about the validity of certain postulates of CTM, differ-
ent points are of different value for our purposes. Thus, the extent to which 
metaphors influence thinking and behaviour is not so important for the issues 
investigated in this study. Much more important are the purely linguistic ques-
tions, such as the question whether certain traces of the source concept are im-
plicitly present in the structure of the target concept. If these conceptual traces 
exist, do they influence the use of a given lexical unit? If so, do they belong to 
the semantic structure of this lexical unit? What metalanguage must be devel-
oped in order to be able to capture the relevant specifics of the semantic struc-
ture? If the traces of the source concept do not influence the use of a given lexi-
cal unit (i.e. no relevant combinatorial constraints can be found), does this mean 
that there are none? Alternatively, could they be implicitly present in the plane 
of content and play a certain role at the conceptual level, which would be poten-
tially significant for the actual meaning? Which level is more salient linguisti-
cally, the abstract level of conceptual metaphors, at which very general corre-
spondences between source and target can be stated, or the more concrete level 
of individual mappings (i.e. frame correspondences in the sense of Baranov & 
Dobrovol’skij 1996, 2000), at which individual lexical units can be distin-
guished from each other? What tasks of linguistic description demand address-
ing what parts of metaphor structure? 
As for the question concerning linguistically relevant conceptual traces in the 
semantic structure of idioms, we can state that some idioms reveal usage restric-
tions due to mental images fixed in their lexical structure. The examples dis-
cussed in (11-16) have shown how mental images can influence the use of cer-
tain idioms. However, this does not mean that all idioms behave in this manner. 
Obviously, many idioms are indifferent towards the underlying images. We sug-
gest that even in such cases (i.e. where no relevant combinatorial constraints can 
be found) certain traces of the source concept are implicitly present in the struc-
ture of the target concept. These traces can become explicit in contexts that fo-
cus on the image in question. In other words, parts of the mental image underly-
ing the actual meaning of a given idiom belong to its plane of content, even if 
they may not be qualified as components of its semantic structure in the strict 
sense.
As far as the question of linguistic salience of levels is concerned, our results 
suggest that the level of rich images is the most promising for revealing specific 
semantic and pragmatic features of single idioms, i.e. for describing every idiom 
as a lexical unit with a unique set of properties. Often some concrete features of 
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the metaphor structure play a more important role for determining the actual 
meaning of an idiom than does the metaphor’s schematic structure fixed in the 
conceptual mapping. At the basic level, near-synonymous idioms can be distin-
guished from each other. In addition to that, certain combinatorial constraints 
can be explained better by addressing the less abstract parts of the metaphor 
structure than by addressing the level of conceptual metaphor. 
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion above 
is that CTM in its present version does not cover all relevant aspects of the se-
mantic and pragmatic behaviour of idioms. The knowledge of underlying con-
ceptual metaphors is not the only type of knowledge which is linguistically rele-
vant. In order to describe how idioms function, one has to take into account 
other concepts as well, above all culturally based concepts, which in many cases 
govern the inference from literal to figurative. The Conventional Figurative 
Language Theory proposed in (Dobrovol’skij & Piirainen, 2005) is specially de-
signed to uncover the relevant features of conventional figurative units, such as 
idioms, proverbs, lexicalised one-word-metaphors, etc. 
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KOGNITIVNA TEORIJA METAFORE I ANALIZA FRAZEMA
U ovom se radu ispituje u kojoj se mjeri metode analize razvijene u okviru kognitivne teorije 
metafore (CTM - Cognitive Theory of Metaphor) mogu primijeniti na analizu frazema. Kon-
vencionalizirane figurativne metafore, a tako i frazemi, imaju razliþitu funkciju i razliþitu 
kognitivnu i komunikacijsku vrijednost u odnosu na nove metafore. Frazemi znatno manje 
doprinose strukturiranju nestrukturiranih situacija, veü prenose razliþite vrste znanja koja su 
akumulirali tijekom svojega postojanja u jeziku. Ono što je uz kognitivnu teoriju metafore 
nužno je teorija koja je posebno osmišljena kako bi se opisale nepravilnosti frazema. Ovaj je 
rad doprinos razvoju takve teorije. 
Kljuþne rijeþi: analiza frazema, teorija konvencionalnih figurativnih izraza, kognitivna te-
orija metafore, konceputalna metafora, kulturološka semiotika, kulturološko znanje, simbol-
iþko znaþenje
